Racial and gender disparities are prevalent in the criminal justice system. In this paper, we investigate the extent to which the political affiliation of judges contributes to these disparities. We use rich data on approximately half a million federal defendants sentenced between 1999 and 2015 linked to sentencing judge. Exploiting the random assignment of cases to judges, we find that Republican appointed judges sentence black defendants to longer prison terms than similar whites compared to Democratic appointed judges, approximately half of the racial sentence gap. Republican judges also sentence female defendants to fewer months than similar male defendants compared to Democratic judges, roughly one-third the gender sentence gap. Consistent with the association between disparities and political affiliation being due to judge preferences, the association is stronger when judges are granted more discretion. We also find evidence that much of the racial and gender disparities by political affiliation are driven by Republican judges born in the Midwest/South. Our findings contribute to understanding both the significance of judges' political affiliation and the sources of racial and gender disparities in sentencing.
Introduction
In the United States, racial and gender disparities are prevalent in the criminal justice system and have long been the subject of significant attention. Black defendants receive substantially longer prison sentences than otherwise similar white offenders (United States Sentencing Commission 2012, Fischman and Schanzenbach 2012), with substantial across-judge variation in the racial sentencing gap (Abrams et al. 2012 ). This racial disparity in sentencing decisions contributes to the fact that black defendants comprise a disproportionate fraction of the prison population relative to their proportion in the overall population (Carson and Sabol 2012) . Similarly, male defendants are sentenced to substantially longer time in prison than female defendants even after accounting for arrest offense and criminal history (Mustard 2001 , Starr 2015 . These large racial and gender disparities have long been the subject of heated debate. As a result, understanding the sources of these disparities is an important policy question. In this study, we investigate whether judges' political preferences influence racial and gender gaps in sentencing decisions.
Prior research has shown that Republican judges reach different outcomes compared to Democratic judges in a variety of contexts (see Sunstein et al. 2006 ). In the context of criminal sentencing, Republican judges have been reported to give longer sentences for the same crime compared to their Democratic appointed counterparts (see Schanzenbach and Tiller 2007, 2008) . However, unexplored is the question of whether judges' political preferences are a source of the persistent and large racial and gender disparities in federal criminal sentencing. This question is of growing importance because of the increasing politicization of the federal judiciary where judges are appointed for lifetime terms, particularly among federal district court judges who "serve as the final arbiter of more than 99 percent of all federal court litigation" (Scherer 2005 , Binder and Waltzman 2009 , Wittes 2009 ). Today, the appointments process for lower court judges has reached heightened interest, with senators regularly debating the qualification of nominees, such as whether nominees would bring with them ideological agendas or other disqualifying biases. Given the increasing politicization of the appointments process, in recent years, the Senate has confirmed fewer lower court judges by unanimous consent than historically and the average time from nomination to confirmation now exceeds several months compared to weeks historically (see Rutkus 2016) , leading some to claim that "[j]udicial selection has been contentious at numerous junctures in U.S. history, but seldom has it seemed more acrimonious and dysfunctional than in recent years" (Binder and Maltzman 2009 ).
Estimating the impact of judge political affiliation on sentencing decisions has been complicated by the lack of data linking judge identifiers to defendant characteristics and case outcomes. Prior research on the subject has almost exclusively relied on court-level variation in the percent of Democratic or Republican judges within a district court to study the impact of political affiliation on sentencing (see e.g. Schanzenbach and Tiller 2007) . However, relying on aggregate court-level variation can lead to biased estimates if courts with different compositions differ in ways that affect all judges in the district court. Using only court-level variation, one prior paper finds that racial disparities do not vary when a court is comprised of more Democratic appointed judges (Schanzenbach 2015) . A few papers employ small samples linked to sentencing judge to explore the impact of political affiliation on sentencing in the aggregate in the federal system. For example, Schanzenbach and Tiller (2008) link approximately 2,200 sentencing decisions to the judge, finding that individual Republican judges giving longer sentences for the same crime compared to their Democratic appointed counterparts.
In this paper, we improve upon the prior literature by relying on individual judge-level variation in over half a million cases and controlling extensively for a full set of judge fixed effects to account for unobserved differences in sentencing driven by judges and prosecutors. Specifically, to investigate whether judge political affiliation affects disparities in sentencing, we build a new dataset linking federal sentencing data with judge information for defendants sentenced between 1999 and 2015.
In our sample, we observe the sentencing practices of approximately 1,400 unique judges. Using this data, we analyze whether judge political affiliation can explain the large racial and gender disparities in sentencing. Intuitively, we compare how judges appointed by a Republican President ("Republican judges") sentence black versus white offenders, or female versus male offenders, relative to judges appointed by a Democratic President ("Democratic judges").
The key assumption of our empirical design is that any differences in characteristics of cases assigned to Republican versus Democratic judges are not unbalanced by defendant race or gender.
This assumption allows us to infer that any differences in disparities by political affiliation are not the product of differences in observed and unobserved case characteristics across judges. We document that there is no differential case selection to Republican versus Democratic judges by defendant race or gender. As a result, any systematic differences in the sentencing outcomes of black versus white offenders, or female versus male offenders, can be attributed to differences associated with judge political affiliation rather than differences in case and defendant characteristics.
In sharp contrast to the prior literature relying on court-level variation, we find that Republican judges give substantially longer prison sentences to black offenders versus observably similar white offenders compared to Democratic judges within the same district court. The racial gap by political affiliation is 1.4 months, approximately 50 percent of the average racial sentence gap. We also find that Republican judges give female defendants 1.5 months less in prison than similar male defendants compared to Democratic judges, 30 percent of the average gender sentence gap. These racial and gender gaps by judge political affiliation cannot be explained by other observable judge characteristics such as judge race or judge gender and persist even after controlling for a full set of judge fixed effects.
Next, we explore the potential mechanisms that drive these differential disparities by judge political affiliation. In particular, we analyze three importance dimensions that may affect sentencing behavior: (1) judicial discretion, (2) judicial tenure, and (3) region of birth. First, we analyze whether differences in disparities by political affiliation are driven by individual judge preferences.
Specifically, we test whether sentencing differences by political affiliation expand when judges are granted more discretion, and thus when they are more free to exhibit their preferences. We exploit plausibly exogenous variation in the timing of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, which greatly increased judicial discretion by making the prior mandatory Sentencing Guidelines advisory. We find that after Booker, the racial gap in sentence length increased generally, but particularly among cases assigned to Republican judges. After Booker, Republican judges sentence blacks to 1.3 months longer compared to similar white defendants, relative to their Democratic appointed colleagues, further increasing racial gaps by political affiliation.
Second, we examine whether judicial experience alters racial and gender disparities by political affiliation given evidence that judges change their behavior the longer they serve (Eisenberg and Johnson 1991, Epstein et al. 1998 ). We find that the difference in disparities by political affiliation is largest in the earlier stages of a judge's career, and becomes much smaller and sometimes statistically insignificant with judge tenure. These results suggest that, potentially due to learning and acculturation, judges converge in their sentencing patterns. However, we find that convergence occurs much more slowly among cases decided after Booker, suggesting that experience and expanded judicial discretion have opposing effects on racial and gender disparities by judge political affiliation.
Finally, we explore the intensity of political preferences as reflected by region of birth. We find that racial and gender disparities by political affiliation are largely driven by Republican judges born in the Midwest/South, regions most often associated with a more conservative ideology, relative to Democratic judges. For Republican judges born in the Midwest/South, the average racial gap in sentence length is 2.4 months larger than for Democratic judges within the same court, with the difference being larger post-Booker. These results are consistent with Alesina and La Ferrara (2014) who find that racial bias in capital sentencing is driven exclusively by capital sentences from Southern states. We find a similar effect on gender gaps in sentence length, with differences by political affiliation primarily driven by Republican judges born in the Midwest/South. In contrast, we find statistically insignificant differences in both racial and gender disparities for Republican judges born in the West/Northeast compared to Democratic judges. These results provide further support that preferences and ideology may explain our results.
In the last part of our paper, we consider the possibility that decisions made by federal prosecutors may explain our results. Because prosecutorial discretion can lead to differential treatment of defendants prior to sentencing (Rehavi and Starr 2014), we consider whether our main findings can be accounted for by differential decisions made by prosecutors that affect sentence length. Accounting for the charging of binding and non-binding mandatory minimums and the application of a government-sponsored substantial assistance motion, we find that prosecutors do not differentially charge black or female defendants when the case is assigned to a Republican versus Democratic judge. These results suggest that our main findings are not solely driven by prosecutorial discretion, but rather judge-driven differences in sentencing that are associated with political ideology.
Overall, our findings suggest that judicial politics may be a source of the persistent racial and gender disparities in the federal criminal justice system and that politics may play an even larger role today under the current state of increased sentencing discretion. These results also indicate that the appointment of federal judges can have profound distributional effects on the criminal justice system given the significance of the sentencing decisions made by federal judges. The federal criminal justice system is the source of the largest and fastest growing prison population (Congressional Research Service 2013) with federal judges making thousands of sentencing decisions a year. Our estimates suggest that a ten percent increase in the share of Republicans in each court would increase the racial sentencing gap by approximately 20 percent. Alternatively, during an average four-year term, a Republican president has the potential to alter the partisan composition of the district courts by approximately 13 percent, potentially increasing the racial sentencing gap by 26 percent.
Our paper contributes to the broad literature documenting the effects of judges' characteristics, including their political preferences, on their decisions. 1 Our paper is also related to the large literature on the presence of racial and gender disparities at various stages of the criminal justice process. 2 Like prior work, we document the presence of both racial and gender disparities in federal sentencing. However, we contribute to an understanding of the sources of these disparities by showing that judge political affiliation contributes to these disparities in a significant manner.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section I provides a brief overview of the federal sentencing system. Section II describes our data and provides summary statistics. Section III describes our empirical strategy. Section IV presents our results and Section V concludes.
I. Background

A. Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, federal judges had virtually unlimited discretion to sentence within broad statutory ranges of punishment. This large degree of discretion led to concerns about sentencing disparities (e.g. inter-judge, socioeconomic, and racial) and a lack of transparency in sentencing decisions (Frankel 1973) . Some members of the public also argued that during this era of indeterminate sentencing, judges endangered public safety with lenient sentencing of offenders (Tonry 2005 ).
In order to eliminate unwarranted sentencing disparities "among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct," Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) to adopt and administer the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the Guidelines apply to all federal offenses committed after November 1, 1987 , and prohibit courts from using race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socioeconomic status in sentencing decisions.
Under the Guidelines, each defendant is assigned to one of 43 offense levels and to one of six Lim et al. 2016 ). In particular, scholars have focused in large part on the political affiliation of the appointing president, which reflects the policy preferences of judges (Cross and Tiller 1998, George 2001) , with judges appointed by Republican presidents tending to be more conservative than judges appointed by Democratic presidents (Brudney, Schiavoni, and Merritt 1999, Gottschall 1986 ). In a related literature, scholars have studied the impact of judge race, gender, tenure, and family background on case outcomes (see, e.g. Gruhl criminal history categories. The more serious and harmful the offense, the higher the offense level. In many courts, cases are randomly assigned to federal district court judges after charges are filed in order to "assure equitable distribution of caseloads and avoid judge shopping." 3 According to the Administrative Office of the US Courts, "[t]he majority of courts use some variation of a random drawing" as prescribed by local court orders. 4 Exploiting the random assignment of cases to judges, early work documented that the adoption of the Guidelines reduced inter-judge sentencing disparities. Anderson, Kling, and Stith (1999) found that the difference in sentence length between two typical judges fell from 17 percent of the average sentence before the Guidelines to 11 percent in the several years after the Guidelines were implemented. However, many scholars criticized the adoption of the mandatory Guidelines for shifting power to prosecutors in their charging and plea-bargaining decisions (see Cabranes 1998, Alschuler 1978 , Nagel and Schulhofer 1992).
For almost two decades, the Guidelines were mandatory and a judge was only permitted to depart from the Guidelines if there were recognized aggravating or mitigating circumstances. A judge departing from the Guidelines sentencing range would also have to justify her reasons for departure to the appellate court. In United States v. Booker, decided in January of 2005, the Supreme Court held that the long-standing mandatory federal Guidelines were unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment. The Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial requires that, other than a prior conviction, only facts admitted by a defendant or proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury may be used to impose a sentence higher than the statutory maximum sentence. However, rather than invalidating the Guidelines altogether, the Supreme Court held that the Guidelines would be "effectively advisory," as opposed to mandatory. The Court explained that "district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing." Today, sentencing judges first calculate the recommended Guidelines range but are free to vary or depart from the range. As a result, Booker greatly increased the degree of judicial discretion afforded to judges. interest and concern given that these judges decide a wide range of issues and are appointed for lifetime terms (Rutkus 2016) . Indeed, the nomination process for lower court judges has involved substantially more Senate debate in recent years, in particular on whether nominees would be able to set aside any ideological biases, leading to a dramatic increase in the time from appointment to confirmation.
We follow the prior literature in using the most common measure of judge ideology: the political affiliation of the appointing president. A natural question may be whether the party of the appointing president is a good proxy for the political affiliation or ideology of the sentencing judges.
Indeed, judicial appointments may be influenced not only by the President but also the Senate. In the United States, under the norm of senatorial courtesy, a Senator of the same party as the President can exercise considerable influence on who is appointed to a judgeship. Nevertheless, prior researchers have found that in the context of federal district courts, the party of the appointing President is substantially correlated with other ideological proxies, such as the judge's own political affiliation or the political affiliation of same-party Senators (see Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2013).
II. Data
A. Data Sources
This paper utilizes data from three sources: (1) Sentencing characteristics include the district court in which sentencing occurred (94 total) and the sentencing month and year. 5 Data is also available on whether a case is settled by plea agreement or trial, probation length, and the amount of any fines imposed. In this paper, we rely on sentence length in months, including zeros, as our primary sentencing outcome. For sentence length, we top-code at the first and 99th percentiles to remove the influence of outliers.
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse -We also use proprietary data from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), which provides sentencing data obtained through While the sample of cases in our matched dataset is skewed towards more serious cases, we also explicitly test for the underlying assumption in our empirical design: that any difference in case characteristics by judge political affiliation is similar for black and white defendants, and female and male defendants. We empirically explore this assumption in Section II.B.
Federal Judicial Center -To provide information on judge characteristics, we further match the USSC and TRAC linked data to judge biographical data from the Federal Judicial Center. 6 From the Federal Judicial Center, we obtain information on judge race, gender, political affiliation of appointing president, commission year, birth year and region, and prior experience as a prosecutor.
In our sample from 1999-2015, there is a total of 1,398 unique active judges. Among these judges, 43.8 percent were appointed by Democratic presidents, 82.2 percent are white, and 79.7 percent are male. percent among Republican judges. These differences in judge race and judge gender are statistically significant. However, Democratic and Republican judges are similar in terms of age at appointment, background experience as former prosecutors, and region of birth. Table 2 reveals that judges are approximately 50 years of age at the time of appointment, and that the majority of appointed judges were born in the Northeast or South.
In Table 3 , we present additional summary statistics by cases that were decided before Booker 
B. Testing for Case Selection by Political Affiliation
In this section, we test for whether there is differential case selection by political affiliation that varies by defendant race or gender. Specifically, because our paper tests whether judge political affiliation is a source of disparities in sentencing, we rely on the assumption that any differences in case characteristics across Republican and Democratic judges are not different by offender traits such as race or gender. If there is no differential gap in case characteristics, we can attribute differences in sentence length disparities to political affiliation itself, rather than observable and unobservable case characteristics that affect sentencing outcomes. As described previously in Section I.A, cases are randomly assigned to sentencing judges in many district courts. 7 In order to formally test this assumption, we regress three key case characteristics that determine the Guidelines sentencing range (criminal history category, base offense level, and final offense level)
on an indicator for being assigned to a Republican judge versus a Democratic judge. In these specifications, we control for district court and year fixed effects and cluster our standard errors at the judge level. Table 4 presents results testing for differential case selection by defendant race. Column 1 of Table 4 presents results testing for differential case selection of black defendants on an indicator for being assigned to a Republican judge. Column 2 presents analogous results testing for differential case selection of white defendants, and column 3 presents p-values testing for the difference in the Republican judge indicator for black and white defendants. In column 1, we find that among black defendants, Republican judges are assigned cases with slightly higher criminal history categories and cases with higher base and final offense levels compared to Democratic judges. In column 2, we present the analogous results for white defendants and find a similar pattern. In general,
Republican judges appear to have more "serious" cases, potentially due to offense level manipulation (Schanzenbach and Tiller 2008) . In column 3, we test whether case differences by political affiliation differ by defendant race. Reassuringly, we find no evidence that differences in case selection by political affiliation differ by the race of the defendant.
In contrast, we continue to find evidence of significant differences in sentence length by judge political affiliation. In the last row of Table 4 , we present results testing for differences in sentence length by political affiliation. We find, conditional on district court and year fixed effects, that
Republican judges sentence white offenders to 3.2 months longer than Democratic judges, but sentence black offenders to 5.8 months longer than Democratic judges, with the difference (2.6 months) statistically significant at the five percent level (p-value = 0.012). Again, given that there is no relative difference by defendant race in the types of cases assigned to Republican and Democratic judges, this statistically significant difference in sentence length is likely due to judge political affiliation. Table 5 presents an analogous set of results testing for differential case selection by defendant gender. As with the results by defendant race, we continue to find that Republican judges have on average more "serious" cases for both female offenders and male offenders relative to Democratic judges. However, the difference in these case characteristics is not statistically different by defendant gender (column 3 of Table 5 ). In contrast, we continue to find significant differences in sentencing.
Republican judges sentence female defendants to 2.3 months longer than Democratic judges, but sentence male defendants to 4.4 months longer than Democratic judges, with the difference (2.1 months) statistically significant at the one percent level (p-value = 0.003). In sum, these results indicate that any differences in racial or gender gaps in sentencing by political affiliation are unlikely to be due to differential case selection, but rather judge-specific ideology.
III. Empirical Methodology
A. Estimation Specification
This paper estimates the impact of judge political affiliation on racial and gender disparities in sentencing. Intuitively, we compare how similar white and black defendants (or female and male defendants) are sentenced based on whether they are assigned to a Democratic or Republican judges within the same district court. In the previous section, we provide empirical support for our underlying assumption that the types of cases assigned to Republican versus Democratic judges do not differ by defendant race or defendant gender.
Our main specification is of the form:
where Y ijtc is the sentence length (including zeros) for defendant i sentenced by judge j in year t and district court c. Republican ij is an indicator variable for whether defendant i was sentenced by a Republican appointed judge j. Black i is an indicator for whether the defendant i is black, where the omitted category is white. F emale i is an indicator for whether the defendant i is female, where the omitted category is male.
X i comprises a vector of demographic characteristics including gender, age, age squared, number of dependents, education, and citizenship status. Case characteristics include the most severe offense type, whether the case resolved by plea or trial, and whether the offense involved the use of a weapon. X i also includes a full set of fixed effects for each final offense level and final criminal history combination (258 total). The specification also includes sentencing year fixed effects (γ t ) and district court fixed effects (κ c ). All standard errors are clustered at the judge level to account for serial correlation.
In this specification, β 1 estimates any difference in the average sentences imposed by Republican versus Democratic judges for observably similar offenders. We also estimate specifications similar to Equation (1) but controlling for a full set of judge fixed effects (σ j ):
These judge fixed effects capture time-invariant unobserved differences in sentencing across judges to the extent that there are slight deviations from random case assignment. These judge fixed effects also control for differential behavior of prosecutors in response to the particular identity of the sentencing judge.
In addition to documenting how racial and gender disparities differ by the political affiliation of the sentencing judges, we also explore how sentencing differences by judge ideology change in response to increased judicial discretion. As discussed previously, we explore whether the differential race and gender disparities by political affiliation change when judges have more discretion using the timing of Booker as a natural experiment. We estimate these effects using a standard differencesin-differences methodology. For example, in the context of racial disparities, our specification is of the form:
Here, α 6 measures the impact of Booker on racial disparities in sentence length. The coefficient of interest is α 7 , which captures how the differential gap in racial disparities by political affiliation changes after Booker. With the addition of judge fixed effects, this estimate is identified off of changes within judges over time. Because Booker may have been anticipated by judges, we exclude the three months before and after Booker in this particular specification.
IV. Results
A. Main Results Table 6 presents our main results for sentence length in months. In column 1, we estimate the effect of uninteracted defendant and judge characteristics on sentence length. Column 2 adds a full set of judge fixed effects. In column 3, we estimate our main specification, Equation (1), which interacts defendant race and defendant gender with judge political affiliation. In column 4, we estimate Equation (2), which adds judge fixed effects to our main specification. In all regressions, we control for the full set of defendant demographic and crime characteristics. We also include district court and sentencing year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level throughout. Democratic judges, 2.6 percent of the mean sentence length. These results are very similar with the addition of judge fixed effects in column 2, indicating that our results are robust to accounting for unobserved judge differences.
In column 3, we find that part of the racial and gender gaps in sentencing are driven by judge Next, we explore the potential for judges to exhibit differential sentencing behavior due to ownrace or own-gender effects, rather than political affiliation per se. For example, Republican judges are more likely to be male. If male judges are more likely to give fewer months in prison to female defendants compared to male defendants, this could explain our main finding that Republican judges exhibit smaller gender disparities than Democratic judges. Similarly, Republican judges are more likely to be white. If white judges impose higher sentence lengths for black defendants compared to white defendants, judge race may explain our previous finding that Republican judges exhibit larger racial disparities than their Democratic counterparts.
In column 1 of Table 7 , we test for own-race and own-gender effects by interacting judge race with defendant race and judge gender with defendant gender. In addition, we also control for our full set of judge effects. Our results indicate that these interactions are relatively small and statistically insignificant, suggesting that judge race and gender play a limited role in explaining both racial and gender disparities in sentencing. In column 2 of Table 7 , we estimate our main specification adding these own-race and own-gender interactions to test for whether our results by political affiliation are due to other judge characteristics. Unsurprisingly, given our results in column 1, we find that even after controlling for these other race and gender interactions, there is a large and significant effect of judge political affiliation on racial and gender gaps in sentencing. As before, Republican judges exhibit larger racial and gender disparities compared to Democratic judges, and the magnitudes of these effects are almost identical to those in our main results (Table 6 ). These findings indicate that our main findings are due to judge ideology as proxied by the political affiliation of the appointing president.
Appendix Table 1 
B. Increased Judicial Discretion
In this next section, we further explore whether racial and gender disparities driven by judge political affiliation are the result of judge-specific preferences. Specifically, if these disparities in sentencing by political affiliation reflect preferences, we might expect to see larger or more pronounced differences when judges are given more discretion. Recall that prior to 2005, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory, such that judges were generally constrained to the sentence length recommended by the intersection of the offense level and criminal history. After the Supreme Court's January 2005 decision in Booker, the Guidelines were rendered advisory such that judges could sentence outside of the Guidelines-recommended range. As a result, one might expect judges to be more free in exhibiting their true sentencing preferences in the aftermath of Booker. Indeed, the rate of departures from the Guidelines-recommended range increased sharply in the aftermath of Booker (USSC 2012, Yang 2014). Table 8 presents these results. In column 1 of Table 8 , we present results from our main specification using cases decided before Booker (1999-2005) and in column 2 we present results using cases decided after Booker (2005 Booker ( -2015 . Column 3 presents results interacting a Booker indicator with offender and judge characteristics consistent with Equation (3) -a differences-in-differences estimate. Recall that because judges may have anticipated Booker, we remove any anticipation effects by excluding from this specification cases that were sentenced within three months of the Booker decision. In all specifications, we control for the full set of defendant demographic and crime characteristics, in addition to fixed effects for each offense level and criminal history category combination. Specifications also include district court fixed effects, sentencing year fixed effects, and a full set of judge fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the judge level.
In our sample of cases decided before Booker (column 1), we find that black defendants are sentenced to 2.6 months longer than observably similar white defendants. However, we find limited evidence that Republican and Democratic judges exhibit different racial gaps in sentencing. The interaction between our Republican judge indicator and defendant race is statistically insignificant in this pre-Booker period. In contrast, Republican judges exhibit larger gender disparities than Democratic judges, issuing sentences to female defendants that are 0.92 months lesser than male defendants. In the sample of cases decided after Booker (column 2), racial disparities by judge political affiliation are much larger and become highly statistically significant. According to column 2, Republican judges sentence black defendants to 2.0 months longer in prison relative to whites compared to their Democratic counterparts. The magnitude of this difference is roughly 67 percent of the average racial gap in sentence length after Booker. Gender disparities by political affiliation are also larger and highly significant after Booker, with Republican judges sentencing females to 1.7 months less than males compared to Democratic judges, 34 percent of the average gender gap in sentence length. These results suggest that disparities by judge political affiliation are larger after judges are granted more direction.
To more directly test this hypothesis, we combine all our cases and provide differences-indifferences estimates in column 3. Column 3 indicates that racial disparities increased in general after Booker. After Booker, black defendants are sentenced to 0.98 months longer in prison than similar white defendants. We also find that after Booker, Republican judges give longer sentences to all offenders compared to Democratic judges. Specifically, after Booker, Republican judges give all defendants 1.8 months longer in prison compared to Democratic judges. In addition, the interaction of Booker, judge political affiliation, and defendant race indicates that post-Booker, racial disparities by political affiliation expanded. After Booker, black defendants assigned to Republican judges receive an additional 1.3 months longer in prison relative to similar white defendants compared to if they had been assigned to a Democratic judge. These results indicate that our main findings on racial gaps by political affiliation are largely driven by the cases decided after Booker when judges were granted substantially more discretion. In contrast, we find more limited evidence that differences in gender disparities by political affiliation changed after Booker. Throughout the entire sample period, Republican judges consistently exhibited larger gender disparities than Democratic judges.
C. Judge Tenure
Next, we explore whether differences in racial and gender sentence gaps by judge political affiliation change with judge tenure. Judges may change how they decide cases based on how long they have served on the bench, potentially learning with experience (see Epstein et al. 1998 , Kaheny et al.
2008). We test for different sentencing behavior based on experience by separately estimating our main specification for judges with different years of experience. In particular, we split sentencing decisions in those decided in the first five years of a judge's tenure, five to ten years, and more than ten years. Given the time span of our study and the life tenure of district court judges, the majority of cases in our sample are decided by judges with at least ten years of experience on the federal bench. Table 9 presents these results. In columns 1 through 3, we present results separately by years of experience. We find evidence that Republican judges exhibit substantially larger racial disparities in the first five years of tenure relative to Democratic judges. In the first five years, Republican judges sentence black defendants to 3.1 months longer than similar white defendants relative to Democratic judges. By five to ten years of experience, the difference in racial gaps by political affiliation falls to 1.9 months, and by more than ten years of experience, the difference becomes statistically insignificant at 0.7 months. These results indicate that with greater experience on the bench, Republican and Democratic judges converge in their sentencing of black offenders relative to white offenders.
We find a similar convergence pattern with respect to the sentencing of female defendants relative to male defendants. In the first five years, Republican judges sentence female defendants to 2.4 fewer months than similar white defendants relative to Democratic judges. By five to ten years of experience, the difference in gender gaps by political affiliation falls to 1.1 months, and by more than ten years, the difference remains at 1.2 months. While still statistically significant ten years out, the difference in gender disparities by political affiliation is more than halved from the first five years of a judge's career. These results indicate that years of experience, and any learning associated with it, may reduce racial and gender gaps caused by judge ideology. 8 Recall that we find that larger differences in racial gaps by political affiliation emerged primarily after judges were granted more discretion after Booker (see Table 8 ). The extent to which judge experience affects sentencing behavior may also be affected by the underlying regime. For example, judges may learn to sentence more consistently and equitably with more experience due to the constraining effect of the mandatory Guidelines. In a world in which the Guidelines are simply advisory, greater experience may have a different effect on sentencing behavior.
To explore the interaction between judge experience and discretion, we separately estimate our experience results by cases decided before Booker and after Booker. Table 10 presents these results.
In the subsample of cases decided prior to Booker, we find no statistically significant differences in racial disparities by political affiliation, regardless of years of experience. However, these racial disparities by political affiliation are significant among cases decided after Booker, although some of the differences across judges converges with experience. For example, in columns 5 through 7, we find that in the first five years of tenure, Republican judges sentence black defendants to 3.0 months longer than similar whites compared to Democratic judges, which decreases to 2.4 months in the five to ten years of experience, and further decreases to 1.4 months for judges with ten or more years of experience, although the estimate remains statistically significant. We find similar patterns with respect to gender disparities by political affiliation, with most of the disparities emerging post-Booker and remaining significant with judge experience, although Republican and Democratic judges do converge in their sentencing with more time on the bench. Combined, these results suggest that as judges become more experienced, they converge in their sentencing of different offenders.
However, experience has a smaller impact on convergence in sentencing outcomes when judges are granted more discretion, potentially because the Guidelines have less of a constraining effect when 8 One concern with these estimates may be that by comparing cases decided by judges with differing years of experience, our results may be biased due to the differing composition of judges in each experience range. For example, newer judges will disproportionately have five or fewer years of experience. In unreported results, we also estimate our results using a balanced sample where we limit judges to only those we observe for ten years or more. We continue to find that differences in racial and gender disparities in sentencing by judge political affiliation became smaller as judges become more experienced. they became advisory after Booker.
D. Region of Birth
The previous results indicate that part of the racial and gender gaps in sentencing are driven by judge political affiliation. These differences by political affiliation are responsive to both changes in the underlying environment through changes in judicial discretion and responsive to judicial experience. In this section, we explore another potential mediating mechanism that may explain disparities by judge political affiliation: intensity of political preferences as reflected by region of birth.
Historically, the Midwest and South have voted for Republican candidates in presidential elections and the West and Northeast have voted for Democratic candidates. In Table 11 , we present our main results for all cases, and split by pre-and post-Booker periods. Among the group of Republican judges, we distinguish between judges born in the West/Northeast from judges born in the Midwest/South. Strikingly, we find that racial and gender disparities by political affiliation are the largest among Republican judges both in the Midwest/South relative to Democratic judges. For Republican judges born in the Midwest/South, the average racial gap in sentence length is 2.4 months larger than for Democratic judges within the same court, with the difference being larger postBooker. These results are consistent with Alesina and La Ferrara (2014) who find that racial bias in capital sentencing is driven exclusively by capital sentences from Southern states. We find a similar effect on gender gaps in sentence length, with differences by political affiliation primarily driven by Republican judges born in the Midwest/South. In contrast, we find statistically insignificant differences in both racial and gender disparities for Republican judges born in the West/Northeast and Democratic judges. These results indicate that region of birth, which may reflect the intensity of political preferences and ideology, play an important role in explaining sentencing disparities by political affiliation.
E. Accounting for Prosecutorial Discretion
Because prosecutors have an enormous amount of discretion in the criminal justice system, we also consider whether our main findings can be accounted for by differential decisions made by prosecutors that might affect sentence length. In particular, we consider three important decision margins made by prosecutors. First, we assess whether a mandatory minimum applies at sentencing given that this decision exhibits large racial disparities (Rehavi and Starr 2014) . Second, we assess whether a mandatory minimum binds such that it exceeds the lower end of the Guidelines recommended range. Finally, we assess whether a prosecutor has applied a substantial assistance departure on the basis of significant cooperation of the defendant with the government, a decision that could result in a sentence below an applicable mandatory minimum (see Fischman and Schanzenbach 2012, Yang 2015 ).
Appendix Table 2 regresses each of these three decisions on the full set of defendant demographic and crime characteristics, and our interaction between defendant race/gender and judge political affiliation. Consistent with prior research, we find that prosecutors are significantly more likely to charge and apply mandatory minimums (binding and non-binding) against observably similar black defendants compared to white offenders. In contrast, prosecutors are significantly less likely to offer substantial assistance motions to black defendants relative to white defendants, while they are more likely to offer substantial assistance motions to female defendants relative to male defendants. Importantly, however, we find no evidence that prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining decisions differentially affect defendants by judge political affiliation. In all specifications, the interactions between judge political affiliation, defendant race, and defendant gender are statistically and economically zero. A qualitatively similar set of results accounting for prosecutorial discretion before and after Booker is presented in Appendix Table 3 .
Finally, Appendix Tables 4 and 5 present our main results controlling for the effects of prosecutorial discretion, in the aggregate and before and after Booker. In each specification, we control for the relevant decision margin and its full set of interactions with defendant race and gender and judge political affiliation. We continue to find that Republican judges sentence black defendants to longer prison terms than whites compared to Democratic judges, and that Republican judges also sentence female defendants to shorter prison terms than males compared to Democratic judges, particularly after judges were granted more discretion. These results suggest that our main findings are not solely driven by prosecutorial discretion, but rather judge-specific differences in sentencing that are associated with political ideology.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the impact of judge political affiliation on racial and gender disparities in federal sentencing. Linking approximately half a million defendants to their sentencing judges, we find that Republican judges sentence black defendants to longer prison terms than whites compared to Democratic judges, with the difference by political affiliation approximately half of the average racial gap in sentence length. Republican judges also sentence female defendants to shorter prison terms than males compared to Democratic judges, with this difference representing roughly onethird of the average gender gap in sentencing. These results are robust to controlling for other judge characteristics as well as a full set of sentencing judge fixed effects. Moreover, our main findings are not solely driven by prosecutorial discretion, but rather judge-driven differences associated with political ideology.
Next, we explore potential mechanisms that may drive these differences by political affiliation.
We find that differences in racial disparities by political affiliation expand when judges were given more discretion after the mandatory Guidelines were rendered advisory. These results suggest that our main findings may be driven by judge-specific preferences that are correlated with political affiliation, and that these preferences are more likely to be revealed when judges are given greater discretion. We also find evidence that differences in racial and gender gaps are largest in the first several years of tenure but diminish with greater experience, indicating that judges may learn to sentence more consistently and equitably over time. Finally, we find evidence that much of the disparities by political affiliation are driven by Republican judges born in the Midwest/South, regions most associated with a conservative ideology.
Overall, these results indicate that judicial ideology may be a source of the persistent and large racial and gender disparities in the criminal justice system. The precise reasons why Republican and Democratic judges treat defendants differently by race or gender remain unknown but are consistent with bias against black defendants and bias in favor of female defendants. For instance, some have suggested in the context of defendant gender, that judges may sentence females more leniently than males because of a perception that women are mere accessories to male partners, or that women are primary caregivers to children (see Goulette et al. 2015 , Starr 2015 . Our results suggest that a judge's political ideology may affect how they view the dangerousness or blameworthiness of different defendants.
Our results also have important implications for the appointments process of federal judges.
For example, our results suggest that racial disparities in sentencing would be more than halved if federal district courts were comprised of all Democratic appointed judges, and reduced by 20 percent if courts were comprised of ten percent more judges appointed by Democratic presidents. In recent decades, the typical president has appointed an average of 163 district court judges in a four-year term. 9 Under the current composition of the federal court system, these appointments could change the partisan composition of district courts by approximately 13 percentage points, which could substantially alter gender and racial disparities in the criminal justice system depending on the political affiliation of the appointing president. The potential to change disparities is even larger for two-term presidents.
Ultimately, our results indicate that the selection and appointment of federal district court judges is important not only for administering the legal system, but also has important distributional consequences, particularly in the current system where judges are granted considerable discretion. 10 We view exploring the impact of the selection of public officials on disparities in the criminal justice system as an important area for future research. 9 See, e.g., https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43058.pdf. 10 See for example George Soros' mission to "find, prepare and finance criminal justice reform-oriented candidates for jobs that have been held by longtime incumbents and serve as pipelines to the federal courts..." See http: //www.politico.com/story/2016/08/george-soros-criminal-justice-reform-227519. (2) and (4) we also control for judge fixed effects. Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by judge. Stars denote the level of statistical significance t p < 0.15, * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. The dependent variable is sentence length in months. We control for judge, primary offense type, final offense level x criminal history category, district court, and sentencing year dummies. All results control for judge fixed effects. In column 1, we exclude Hispanic defendants. In column 2, we exclude immigration cases. In column 3, we exclude life sentences. In column 4, we add all exclusions from columns 1-3. In column 5, we add all exclusions from columns 1-3 and control for base offense level instead of final offense level. Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by judge. Stars denote the level of statistical significance t p < 0.15, * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. The dependent variable is sentence length in months. MM is an indicator for any mandatory minimum. BMM is an indicator for any binding mandatory minimum, defined as if the mandatory minimum partially binds over the range set by the Guidelines recommended cell. SA is an indicator for a government-sponsored substantial assistance motion. Column 1 adds a full set of interactions between MM, offender gender and race, and judge political affiliation. Column 2 adds a full set of interactions between BMM, offender gender and race, and judge political affiliation. Column 3 adds a full set of interactions between SA, offender gender and race, and judge political affiliation. We control for judge, primary offense type, final offense level x criminal history category, district court, and sentencing year dummies. All results control for judge fixed effects. Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by judge. Stars denote the level of statistical significance t p < 0.15, * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. The dependent variable is sentence length in months. MM is an indicator for any mandatory minimum. BMM is an indicator for any binding mandatory minimum, defined as if the mandatory minimum partially binds over the range set by the Guidelines recommended cell. SA is an indicator for a government-sponsored substantial assistance motion. Columns 1-2 add a full set of interactions between MM, offender gender and race, and judge political affiliation. Columns 3-4 add a full set of interactions between BMM, offender gender and race, and judge political affiliation. Columns 5-6 add a full set of interactions between SA, offender gender and race, and judge political affiliation. We control for judge, primary offense type, final offense level x criminal history category, district court, and sentencing year dummies. All results control for judge fixed effects.
